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Abstract
We give a simple definition of validity for syllogisms involving necessary and assertoric premises which
validates all and only the Aristotelian apodeictic syllogisms.
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1 The problem
The first systematic study of reasoning and inference in the West was done by Aris-
totle. However, while his assertoric theory of syllogistic reasoning is provably sound
and complete for the class of models validating the inferences in the traditional
square of opposition [5, p. 100], his modal syllogistic, developed in chapters 3 and
8–22 of the Prior Analytics [1], has the rather dubious honor of being one of the
most difficult to understand logical systems in history. Starting with some of his
own students, many have considered Aristotle’s modal syllogistic to be anywhere
from confused to simply wrong [7, ch. 1]. In support of these claims, many critics
point to what is called the “two Barbaras problem”, that is, Aristotle’s treatment of
syllogisms of the form LXL Barbara and XLL Barbara. 1 According to Aristotle,
arguments of the form
Necessarily A belongs to all B.
B belongs to all C.
Therefore, necessarily A belongs to all C.
are valid, while arguments of the form
A belongs to all B.
Necessarily B belongs to all C.
1 See §2 for an explanation of the notation. Throughout this paper we make use of the traditional medieval
mnemonic names of syllogisms [13, p. 21].
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Therefore, necessarily A belongs to all C.
are invalid [1, 30a15–30a33]. Many people have found this position to be inconsis-
tent. 2 Aristotle’s student Theophrastus argued that both syllogisms are invalid [7,
p. 15], since nothing should follow when one premise is necessary and the other
assertoric.  Lukasiewicz, whose views on Aristotle’s modal syllogistic [5] have been
extremely influential on modern approaches to the system, has argued that both
syllogisms are valid [7, p. 15].  Lukasiewicz says that “Aristotle’s modal syllogistic
is almost incomprehensible because of its many faults and inconsistencies” and
“modern logicians have not as yet been able to construct a universally acceptable
system of modal logic which would yield a solid basis for. . . Aristotle’s work” [5,
p. 132]. One of the “faults and inconsistencies” is Aristotle’s acceptance of LXL
Barbara while rejecting of XLL Barbara. Later attempts have been made to give a
consistent interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. McCall [7] gave a syntactic
theory which coincides exactly with the apodeictic fragment of the Aristotelian
theory (the fragment containing just the necessity and assertoric modal operators).
More recently, Johnson [3,4], Thomason [15], and Malink [6] have given semantics
corresponding to McCall’s syntax, showing that Aristotle’s apodeictic fragment is
consistent, if, given the complexity of their semantic models, rather unintuitive.
We offer a new approach to the apodeictic fragment of Aristotelian syllogistics,
which provides a clear and simple definition of validity that validates all and only
those apodeictic syllogisms accepted by Aristotle. First, in §2 we define the no-
tation we use in this paper. Previous attempts at giving syntactic and semantic
characterization of the modal syllogistic are considered in §§4,5. The definition of
validity that we give provides a formalization of the philosophical interpretation of
Aristotle’s apodeictic syllogistic given by Rescher in [8], and refined by McCall in
[7]; we discuss this interpretation in §3, and then give our new formalism in §6. In
§7 we show it is adequate for the pure necessary/assertoric fragment, and discuss
the problems we have faced extending this formalism to the fragment which also
contains the possibility operator. We conclude with some comments about future
work in §8.
2 Notation
Syllogistics is a term logic, so we fix a set TERM of basic terms, and let capital letters
A,B, C . . . range over TERM. (Assertoric) categorical propositions are formed from
copulae a, e, i, o and terms as follows:
AaB ‘A belongs to all B’ ↔ ‘All B are A’ (universal affirmative)
AeB ‘A belongs to no B’ ↔ ‘No B is A’ (universal negative)
AiB ‘A belongs to some B’ ↔ ‘Some B is A’ (particular affirmative)
AoB ‘A does not belong to some B’ ↔ ‘Some B is not A’ (particular negative)
The term preceding the copula is called the predicate term and the term succeeding
it is called the subject term. We follow McCall and use L, X, and M to denote the




A — B B — A A — B
B — C B — C C — B
A — C A — C A — C
Figure 1. The Three Figures
necessary, assertoric, and possible modes, respectively. 3 Hence, if ϕ is an assertoric
categorical proposition, Lϕ, Xϕ, and Mϕ are modal categorical propositions. (Note
that the “assertoric” mode is not any different from the ordinary propositional
mode. We will often designate assertoric propositions without the X.) Categorical
propositions, both assertoric and modal, can be combined to form syllogisms.
Definition 2.1 A triple S = 〈M,m, c〉, where M , m, and c are categorical propo-
sitions, is a syllogism if M , m, and c contain exactly three distinct terms, of which
the predicate of c (called the major term) appears in M and the subject of c (called
the minor term) appears in m, and M and m share a term (called the middle term)
which is not present in c.
We call M the major premise, m the minor, and c the conclusion. The three
ways that major, minor, and middle terms in the premises can be arranged are called
figures (see Figure 1). A figure with three copulae added is called a ‘mood’; by, e.g.,
‘LLL Barbara’ we mean the mood Barbara with each of the premises prefaced with
mode L.
3 Rescher’s interpretation
A supposed drawback of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic according to  Lukasiewicz is
that it “does not have any useful application to scientific problems” [5, p. 181]. In
contrast with this conclusion, Rescher believes not only that the modal syllogistic
can be given a consistent interpretation, but that, in fact, this interpretation is
based on Aristotle’s theory of scientific knowledge and inference. Rescher describes
attempts such those of  Lukasiewicz and Becker [2] as “blind alleys, as regards the
possibility of interpreting Aristotle’s discussion as it stands, without introducing
numerous ‘corrections’ ” [8, p. 165]. He argues that the problem of these formalisms
was that they force an incorrect interpretation of the Prior Analytics. To address
this, Rescher develops a non-formal account of the Prior Analytics which stresses
the scientific nature of the various modal deductions. He argues that:
The key to Aristotle’s theory lies, I am convinced, in viewing the theory of modal
syllogisms of the Analytica Priora in the light of the theory of scientific reasoning
of the Analytica Posteriora [8, p. 170].
On his analysis, the major premise is treated as a general scientific principle or rule
and the minor premise as a specific instance of the general rule [8, p. 171]. Further,
3 We omit from discussion the mode Q ‘contingent’.
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[A] rule that is necessarily (say) applicable to all of a group will be necessar-
ily applicable to any sub-group, pretty much regardless of how this sub-group is
constituted. On this view, the necessary properties of a genus must necessarily
characterize even a contingently differentiated species. If all elms are necessarily
deciduous, and all trees in my yard are elms, then all trees in my yard are nec-
essarily deciduous (even though it is not necessary that the trees in my yard be
elms) [8, p. 172].
This interpretation allows him to make a principled distinction between LXL Bar-
bara and XLL Barbara, since in the first case, the general rule is necessary, and
the particular instance falls under that necessary rule. The conclusion that results
should then be necessary. However, if the general rule is only assertoric, then the
conclusion shouldn’t be necessary, since for Aristotle, the assertoric generally does
not entail the necessary.
McCall rightly points out that this interpretation only works for the first-figure
syllogisms with mixed necessary and assertoric premises. In the case of second and
third figure syllogisms, such as XLL Camestres, the minor premise is the general
rule, and the major premise is the special case. Further, attempting to reduce
the validity of these other figures to that of the first figure is problematic, not
least because one would have to justify the conversion rules used in the reduction.
As an alternative, drawing inspiration from the medieval doctrine of distribution,
McCall points out that, with two exceptions, the general rule is the premise in
which the middle term is distributed, and in a valid syllogism the special case can
be “upgraded” to the modality of the general rule. A term is distributed in a
proposition if “it actually denotes or refers to, in that premiss, the whole of the
class of entities which it is capable of denoting” [7, p. 25]. In AaB, B is distributed;
in AeB, both terms are distributed; in AiB, neither term is distributed; in AoB, A
is distributed. The two restrictions are the following: (1) general rules cannot be
particular and (2) special cases cannot be negative [7, p. 26]. The first exception
allows us to rule out XLL Baroco while the second exception allows us to avoid
XLL Felapton and XLL Bocardo, which are not accepted as valid by Aristotle [1,
31a1–31a18, 31a14–31a33].
The models that we introduce in §6 take seriously this suggestion of Rescher
that we understand modal syllogisms as making a statement about the relationship
between a general scientific law and a special case falling under that law. We will
give a precise definition of what counts as a special case, and make explicit how to
“upgrade” the modality of the special case to that the general rule. Thus, we will
be able to show that if we accept Rescher’s interpretation of the modal syllogistic,
a consistent theory of syllogistic reasoning can be extracted from Aristotle’s works.
4 Syntactic characterizations of the apodeictic fragment
McCall then used his “completion” (as he calls it) of Rescher’s interpretation as
the basis for developing a syntactic system characterizing Aristotle’s apodeictic
fragment of the syllogistic. It is based on the rules of conversion and the perfect
syllogisms that Aristotle defined for the apodeictic syllogistic in the Prior Analytics.
McCall shows that from propositional logic plus an axiomatization of the assertoric
4
Uckelman and Johnston
syllogistic supplemented with six modal axioms, and four laws of modal conversion
and subordination, it is possible to deduce all of the valid apodeictic syllogisms and
reject all of the ones that are invalid according to Aristotle [7, §14]. The six modal
axioms are LXL Barbara, LXL Cesare, LXL Darii, LXL Ferio, LLL Baroco, LLL
Bocardo, and the conversion and subordination rules are:
• from LAiB infer LBiA
• from LAaB infer AaB
• from LAiB infer AiB
• from LAoB infer AoB
McCall made no attempt to give a semantic grounding for his syntactic theory.
Rescher, along with Parks, later developed his interpretation into a proof-theor-
etic account which simplifies McCall’s approach [9], but which only deals with the
L-X fragment (whereas McCall’s syntactic theory can be extended to the L-X-M
fragment). At the heart of their account is the following observation:
The leading idea of our proposal is that given syllogistic terms α and β it is
possible to define yet another term [αβ] to represent the β-species of α. . . they
are those α’s which must be β’s relative to the hypothesis that they are α’s (by
conditional or relative necessity) [9, p. 678–679].
This idea is based on Aristotle’s notion of ekthesis, which allows for deriving uni-
versal propositions from particular ones, and which Aristotle uses to give proofs of
the oblique moods LLL Baroco and LLL Bocardo [9, §3]. (For more information
on ekthesis and its role in Aristotelian syllogistic proofs, see [12]). This observation
allows us to move from “A belongs to all B” to “all Bs, given that they are As, are
necessarily A, with relative necessity, given that they are in fact Bs.” This notion
of relative necessity plays a key role in development of Rescher and Park’s system,
which has just four conversion rules together with the perfect assertoric and wholly
apodeictic syllogisms as axioms. The four conversion rules are as follows:
` AaB ⇒ ` L[BA]aB
` AiB ⇒ ` L[BA]iB
` LAaB ⇒ ` LAa[CB]
` LAeB ⇒ ` LAe[CB]
The complex term [AB] is read ‘A-conditioned-by-B’ or ‘A’s which are B’. These
rules can be understood as follows:
• If A belongs to all B, then being B’s which are A necessarily belongs to all B.
• If A belongs to some B, then being a B which is A necessarily belongs to some B.
• If A necessarily belongs to all B, then A necessarily belongs to all those C which
are B.
• If A necessarily does not belong to any B, then A necessarily belongs to no C
which is a B.
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Rescher and Parks prove the consistency of their theory only in an indirect fash-
ion (by reducing the apodeictic syllogistic to the assertoric one, which was proved
consistent in [11]).
5 Previous semantic attempts
Later authors have attempted to build semantics for McCall’s or an equivalent
axiomatization; three rigorous approaches are those of Johnson [3], Thomason [15],
and [6]. While these semantics are adequate in so far as they validate all of McCall’s
(and hence Aristotle’s) theses, and reject those that should be rejected, they are not
very appealing on grounds of both aesthetics and explanatory value. The systems
are very complicated and could be labeled ad hoc because they are not motivated
beyond being adequate to characterize (McCall’s version) of Aristotle’s theory.
5.1 Johnson’s model
The semantics given by Johnson in [3] are adequate to prove the completeness of
the apodeictic fragment of McCall’s formalization.
Definition 5.1 A Johnson-syllogistic model is a quintuple
MJ = 〈W,V e, V a, V ec , V ac 〉,
where W is a set and the V ij are functions from TERM to 2
W meeting the following
conditions:
(i) V (A) := V e(A) ∪ V a(A)
(ii) V e(A) 6= ∅
(iii) For each A, V jk (A) ∩ V
m
n (A) = ∅ iff either j 6= m or k 6= n; and for each A,
V e(A) ∪ V a(A) ∪ V ec (A) ∪ V ac (A) = W .
(iv) If V (C) ⊂ V ec (B) and V (A) ⊂ V (B) then V (A) ⊂ V ec (C).
(v) If V (B) ⊂ V e(C) and V (A) ∩ V (B) 6= ∅ then V e(A) ∩ V e(C) 6= ∅.
(vi) If V (B) ⊂ V ec (C) and V (A) ∩ V (B) 6= ∅ then V e(A) ∩ V ec (C) 6= ∅.
(vii) If V (C) ⊂ V e(B) and V e(A) ∩ V ec (B) 6= ∅ then V e(A) ∩ V ec (C) 6= ∅.
We think of V e(A) as the set of things which are essentially A, V a(A) as the
things which are accidentally A, V ec (A) is the set of things essentially non-A, and
V ac (A) is the set of things accidentally non-A.
The truth conditions for categorical propositions are as expected:
Definition 5.2
MJ  AaB iff V (B) ⊂ V (A). 4
MJ  AiB iff V (B) ∩ V (A) 6= ∅.
MJ  AeB iff MJ 2 AiB.




MJ  AoB iff MJ 2 AaB.
MJ  LAaB iff V (B) ⊂ V e(A).
MJ  LAeB iff V (B) ⊂ V ec (A).
MJ  LAiB iff V e(B) ∩ V e(A) 6= ∅.
MJ  LAoB iff V e(B) ∩ V ec (A) 6= ∅.
Thom criticizes these semantics in [14], and Johnson responded to Thom’s ob-
jections in [4]. The revised system of [4] was intended to (a) allow that general
terms may designate a property such that no object necessarily has this property
(thus giving up (ii) above), (b) require that if some object has the property desig-
nated by a general term necessarily, then any object which has this property has it
necessarily, and (c) be “intuitively graspable” [4, p. 171]. The system goes beyond
Aristotelian modal logic by allowing singular sentences (that is, sentences involving
constants instead of terms), but it is more restricted than McCall’s syntax in that
it does not account for M propositions. The semantics are substitutionally based.
Thirteen conditions for an acceptable valuation function are given in §3, thus it is by
no means clear that Johnson has succeeded with his goal (c) in the new semantics.
5.2 Thomason’s models
Thomason feels that Johnson’s semantics “is in some respects contrived” [15, p. 111],
and offers a proposal of his own. Thomason finds fault with Johnson’s semantics in
that “the interpretations are explicitly required to satisfy Axioms 6–9 [LXL Cesare,
Darii, and Ferio, and LLL Baroco] of L-X-M” [15, p. 112], and he introduces models
which do away with this requirement.
Definition 5.3 A Thomason-syllogistic model is a quintuple
MT = 〈W, Ext, Ext+, Ext−, V 〉,
where the Exts are functions assigning subsets of W to each term satisfying Ext+ ⊆
Ext, Ext+ 6= ∅, Ext− ∩Ext = ∅, and V is an ordinary two-valued valuation function.
The functions Ext(x), Ext+(x) and Ext−(x) should be understood as picking
out that which is x, is x necessarily, and is necessarily not x respectively. The truth
conditions for the assertoric propositions are the same as in Johnson’s semantics (so
they also do not satisfy existential import), while those for the modal propositions
are defined as follows:
Definition 5.4
V (LAaB) = T iff Ext(A) ⊂ Ext+(B)
V (LAeB) = T iff Ext(A) ⊂ Ext−(B)
V (LAiB) = T iff Ext+(A) ∩ Ext+(B) 6= ∅
V (LAoB) = T iff Ext+(A) ∩ Ext−(B) 6= ∅
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Validity and consequence are defined on these models in the expected way. Then,
the consequences of Axioms 6–9 on this class of models correspond exactly to the
theorems of Johnson’s axiomatization, which in turn corresponds exactly to Aris-
totle’s theory [15, p. 120]. Since these models require the truth of Axioms 6–9 to
be built into the interpretation function, Thomason does not find them adequate,
and instead offers two further classes of models, which satisfy all the requirements
previous outlined and additionally
(i) Ext(x) ∩ Ext(y) 6= ∅ ⇒ Ext(x) ∩ Ext+(y) 6= ∅
(ii) Both (i) and Ext(x) ⊆ Ext−(y) ⇒ Ext(y) ⊆ Ext−(x) and Ext(x) ⊆ Ext+(y) →
Ext−(y) ⊆ Ext−(x).
Aristotle’s theory of the apodeictic syllogistic coincides with the set of consequences
of LLL Baroco and the conversion rule LAeB ⇒ LBeA on the second class of
models [15, p. 122] and with the set of validities of the third class of models [15,
p.124]. Thus, if we build extra structure into the interpretation of the terms, we are
able to recover Aristotelian syllogistics without further assumptions. However, it is
not clear where the justification for this extra structure comes in, other than that
its addition makes the system work. It would be preferable to have a justification
which is less ad hoc and more grounded in Aristotelian philosophy.
5.3 Malink’s models
A rather different approach is taken by Malink in [6]. Malink appeals to Aristotle’s
discussion of types of predication in the Topics for the philosophical grounding of his
interpretation, and bases his reconstruction of the modal syllogistic on what he calls
‘predicable-based modal copula’ [6, p. 97]. In the Topics, there are four different
types of predicables: genus with (a) differentia, (b) definition, (c) proprium, or
(d) accident. These four types of predicables are based on two basic relations,
essential predication (Eab) and accidental predication (Υab). Malink characterizes
the behavior of these two basic relations via the axiomatic system A, consisting of
seven definitions and five axioms, and which “is not intended to give an exhaustive
description of Aristotelian predicable-semantics, but to capture only those aspects
of it which are relevant for the formal proofs of modal syllogistic” [6, p. 98]. These
definitions and axioms are interpreted in graphically-representable structures made
up of the following elements:
• substance term, Σa
◦ nonsubstance term, ¬Σa
substantial essential predication, Eab
. . . . . . merely accidental predication, Υab
−−− non-substantial essential predication, Ẽab
The predicative relations between terms are represented by downward paths in the
diagrams, with the conventions that it is assumed that all substance terms are E
predicated of themselves, and all nonsubstance terms are Ẽ predicated of themselves,
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and when both types of predication coincide, only E predication is drawn.
In Malink’s system, assertoric, necessary, (merely) possible, and contingent cat-
egorical claims are formalized as follows:
XAaB Υab





LAiB ∃z((Υbz ∧ Êaz) ∨ (Υaz ∧ Êbz))
LAoB ∃z(Υbz ∧Kaz) ∨ ∃xv(Êbz ∧ Êav ∧ ∀u(Υau ∧ Σ̂u → Kzu))
MAaB ∀z(Υbz → Π̄az)
MAeB ∀z(Υbz → ¬Ēaz) ∧ ∀z(Υ → ¬Ēbz)
MAiB ∃z(Υbz ∧ Π̄az)
MAoB ¬Ēab
QAa/eB ∀z(Υbz → Πaz)
QAi/oB Πab
where Σa := ∃zEza, Kab := Σa ∧ Σb ∧ ¬∃z(Υaz ∧ Υbz), Πab := ¬(Σa ∧ Σb) ∧
¬Eab∧¬Eba∧ ((Σa∨Σb) → ∃z(Υaz∧Υbz)), Π̄ab := Πab∨Υab, Êab := Eab∨ Ẽab,
Σ̂ab := ∃zEza, Ēab := Eab ∨ (Σa ∧Υab).
With this formalization, Malink is able to validate not only the apodeictic frag-
ment but he can also makes sense of the merely possible and the contingent frag-
ments, making his approach an improvement on both McCall’s syntax as well as
the models of Johnson and Thomason, which only work for the apodeictic frag-
ments. However, this short overview of some of the aspects of Malink’s reconstruc-
tion should be enough to demonstrate its extreme complexity, and there are other
drawbacks with this approach which we discuss in the next section.
5.4 Discussion and critique
While these three types of models are semantically adequate in that their proofs
are sound and their systems correspond to (a fragment of) Aristotelian syllogistic,
there are a number of issues of their formalisms that we want to highlight. First, the
semantics do not really explain what is going on in Aristotle’s system. Each of the
models introduces a primitive distinction between essential and nonessential pred-
ications. In Johnson, the quadripartite interpretation functions correspond to the
notions of necessarily belonging, contingently belonging, contingently not belonging
and necessarily not belonging. Thomason simplifies this to the tripartite distinc-
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tion between what is necessary, what is necessarily not, and what is neither. Malink
reduces this one more step, and distinguishes essential predication and accidental
predication. While building these distinctions into the truth conditions and/or syn-
tax is entirely adequate to capture Aristotle’s notion of necessity and contingency,
doing so reduces what explanatory power the models might have otherwise had.
Furthermore, none of the authors discussed how their semantics correlate with
the or make sense of the new interpretation of Aristotle given by Rescher and dis-
cussed by McCall. Given that Rescher’s interpretation gives a philosophical ground-
ing for why Aristotle’s modal syllogistic validates the syllogisms that it does, it is
unfortunate that when Johnson, Thomason, and Malink develop their semantics,
none of them discuss this philosophical grounding.
6 A new approach
Our new approach to the apodeictic syllogistic is based on making formal the “up-
grade” criterion that McCall gives. Our models are standard models for quantified
modal logic:
Definition 6.1 A simple syllogistic model is a tuple MS = 〈W,D,R, O, V 〉 where
W is a set (of possible worlds); D is a set (of objects); R ⊆ W × W is reflexive,
transitive, and symmetric; for w ∈ W,O(w) ⊆ D is the set of objects existing in w;
and for A ∈ TERM, V (A) ⊆ D is the set of objects in the extension of a term A.
V (A) is extended naturally to V ′(A,w) = V (A) ∩ O(w). The truth conditions
for the assertoric propositions are as expected:
Definition 6.2
MS, w  AaB iff V ′(B,w) 6= ∅ and V ′(B,w) ⊆ V ′(A,w).
MS, w  AiB iff V ′(A,w) ∩ V ′(B,w) 6= ∅.
MS, w  AeB iff V ′(A,w) ∩ V ′(B,w) = ∅.
MS, w  AoB iff V ′(B,w) = ∅ or V ′(A,w) * V ′(B,w).
The first conjunct ensures that our models satisfy existential import, which
Aristotle accepted. Since R is an equivalence relation on W , the modalities L and
M are the usual S5 modalities. What is novel in our semantics is the definition of
the validity of a syllogism, which is given via the concept of model update:
Definition 6.3 For a model MS and formula ϕ, the update of MS by ϕ is the model
MS  ϕ = 〈W  ϕ, D, R  ϕ, O  ϕ, V  ϕ〉 where W  ϕ = {w ∈ W : MS, w  ϕ};
D is unchanged; and R  ϕ, O  ϕ, and V  ϕ are the restrictions of the original
relations and functions to W  ϕ.
Definition 6.4 A premise in a syllogism S is a general rule if (1) the middle term
is distributed (cf. Def. 2.1 and §3) and (2) it is not particular.
A premise in a syllogism is a special case (1) if the other premise is a general











Figure 2. Countermodel for XLL Barbara.
Definition 6.5 A syllogism S with special case s is valid for any simple model MS
and w ∈ W iff (i) MS, w  M and (ii) MS, w  m imply (iii) MS  s, w  c.
The process of model update corresponds to the idea of “upgrading” the special
case argued for by Rescher and McCall. When the general rule is necessary, we can
consider only those worlds where the special case is in fact true, for if it is false
then we do not care whether the conclusion is true or false, and when we restrict
our attention in this fashion, we are able to draw necessary conclusions.
Note that on this definition, a syllogism S can be valid at world W in a simple
model MS even if the premises are true at w and the conclusion false. Thus, the
definition of validity that we introduce is radically different from standard notions
of validity, but this change in approach is justified by Aristotle’s use syllogistics
in scientific reasoning. If we either required that the conclusion already be true
at w in MS, then we would collapse into the same problems that earlier attempts
to formalize the modal syllogistic have, or defined validity so that syllogisms were
only valid in MS, then we would never have any valid modal syllogisms in the “real
world”.
As an example of how this system works, consider the problem of the two Bar-
baras. LXL Barbara is of the form S = 〈LAaB,BaC, LAaC〉. To prove that this
syllogism is valid, suppose that (i) MS, w  LAaB and (ii) MS, w  BaC; we need
to show that (iii) MS  BaC,w  LAaC. By the definition of model restriction,
MS  BaC,w  LBaC since the only worlds remaining are those worlds where BaC
is true. From assumption (i), we also have that MS  BaC,w  LAaB, and we show
that LLL Barbara is valid in the next section. Our proof here is similar in spirit to
Aristotle’s, as he also reduces the case of LXL Barbara to LLL Barbara by using
a type of conditional or relative necessity (cf. [9, §2]). In contrast, XLL Barbara
(= 〈AaB, LBaC, LAaC〉) is not valid, as the counterexample in Figure 2 shows. It
is straightforward to show that any syllogism derivable in McCall’s L-X fragment
[7, Table 7] is validated on these semantics and that any syllogism rejected has a
countermodel on our semantics.
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7 Adequacy and limitations of the semantics
In this section we prove the adequacy of the semantics introduced in the previous
section. It is obvious that all of the purely assertoric syllogisms are valid on our
semantics. Further, note that every valid second- or third-figure assertoric syllogism
can be derived from one of the four perfect first-figure assertoric syllogism by means
of simple conversion (from AeB infer BeA and vice versa, and from AiB infer BiA
and vice versa), accidental conversion (from AaB infer AiB, and from AeB infer
AoB), and reductio ad absurdum or contraposition (interchange the contradictory
of the conclusion with either the contradictory of the major premise or the minor
premise). In the assertoric syllogistic, contraposition is required only for the ar-
gument from XXX Barbara to XXX Bocardo and XXX Baroco. In the modal
syllogistic, neither LXL nor XLL Bocardo or Baroco are valid; therefore, for the
L-X fragment we do not need to consider proof by modal contraposition.
To prove the soundness of the semantics with respect to the L-X fragment of
Aristotelian syllogistic, we first prove that the four perfect LLL syllogisms are valid:
Proposition 7.1 LLL Barbara is valid on our semantics.
Proof Take an arbitrary model MS and assume that (i) MS, w  LAaB and (ii)
MS, w  LBac. It suffices to show that MS  LBaC,w  LAaC. From the definition
of model restriction, we have that MS  LBaC,w  LBaC, which is equivalent
to for all w′, if wRw′ then MS  LBaC,w′  BaC, that is, V ′(C,w′) 6= ∅ and
V ′(C,w′) ⊆ V ′(B,w′). Further, from (i) we have w′, if wRw′ then V ′(B,w′) 6=
∅ and V ′(B,w′) ⊆ V ′(A,w′). Now, take an arbitrary world v such that wRv,
and we have that V ′(B, v) 6= ∅, V ′(B, v) ⊆ V ′(A, v), V ′(C, v) 6= ∅, and finally
V ′(C, v) ⊆ V ′(B, v). Since subset inclusion is transitive, V ′(C, v) ⊆ V ′(A, v), and
hence MS  LBaC, v  AaC. Since v was arbitrary, we have that this holds for all
w′ such that wRw′, which is to MS  LBaA,w  LAaC. 2
Proposition 7.2 LLL Celarent is valid on our semantics.
Proof Take an arbitrary model MS and assume that (i) MS, w  LAeB and (ii)
MS, w  LBaC. Then it suffices to show that MS  LBaC,w  LAeC. From the
definition of restriction, we have that MS  LBaC,w  LBaC, which is equivalent
to for all w′ if wRw′ then V ′(C,w′) 6= ∅ and V ′(C,w′) ⊆ V ′(B,w′). Further, from (i)
we have for all w′, if wRw′ then V ′(A,w′)∩V ′(B,w′) = ∅). Now, take an arbitrary
world v such that wRv, then we have that (1) V ′(A, v) ∩ V ′(B, v) = ∅) and that
(2) V ′(C, v) 6= ∅ and V ′(C, v) ⊆ V ′(B, v). Now take an arbitrary x ∈ D such that
x ∈ V ′(C, v). By (2) we have x ∈ V ′(B, v) since V ′(C, v) ⊆ V ′(B, v). Now, by (1)
we have x 6∈ V ′(A, v). Since x was arbitrary, it follows that V ′(C, v)∩V ′(A, v) = ∅.
Hence MS  LBaC, v  AeC. Since v was arbitrary, it follows that for any w′ such
that wRw′, MS  LBaC,w′  AeC and so MS  LBaC,w  LAeC. 2
Proposition 7.3 LLL Darii is valid on our semantics.
Proof Take an arbitrary model MS and assume that (i) MS, w  LAaB and (ii)
MS, w  LBiC. It suffices to show that MS  LBiC, w  LAiC. From the definition
of restriction, we have that MS  LBiC, w  LBiC, which is equivalent to for all
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w′, if wRw′ then V ′(B,w′) ∩ V ′(C,w′) 6= ∅. Further, from (i) we have for all w′, if
wRw′ then V ′(B,w′) 6= ∅ and V ′(B,w′) ⊆ V ′(A,w′). Now, take an arbitrary world
v such that wRv, and we have that (1) V ′(B, v) 6= ∅ and V ′(B, v) ⊆ V ′(A, v) and
(2) V ′(B, v)∩ V ′(C, v) 6= ∅. Thus, we have that ∃x ∈ V ′(B, v)∩V ′(C, v). Call this
element y, then since y ∈ V ′(B, v), it follows that y ∈ V ′(A, v). Since y ∈ V ′(C, v),
then V ′(C, v) ∩ V ′(A, v) 6= ∅, from which it follows that MS  LBiC, v  AiC.
Now since v was arbitrarily chosen, it follows that for all w′ such that wRw′, MS 
LBiC, w′  AiC and so MS  LBiC, w  LAiC. 2
Proposition 7.4 LLL Ferio is valid on our semantics.
Proof Take an arbitrary model MS be assume that (i) MS, w  LAeB and (ii)
MS, w  LBiC. It suffices to show that MS  LBiC, w  LAoC. From the definition
of restriction, we have that MS  LBiC, w  LAiC. This and (i) are equivalent
to for all w′ such that wRw′, (1) V ′(B,w′) ∩ V ′(C,w′) 6= ∅ and (2) V ′(A,w′) ∩
V ′(B,w′) = ∅. Now, take an arbitrary world v such that wRv. By (1), since
V ′(B, v) ∩ V ′(C, v) 6= ∅, it follows that V ′(C, v) 6= ∅. Further, since y ∈ V ′(B, v)
by (2) it follows that y 6∈ V ′(A, v). Hence, V ′(A, v) * V ′(C, v), and thus MS 
LBiC, w′  AoC. Now since v was arbitrary, it follows that for all w′, wRw′ implies
that MS  LBiC, w′  AoC, as required. 2
The soundness of the necessitated forms of simple and accidental conversion
follow directly from their validity in their assertoric forms. The validity of the XLL
and LXL syllogisms corresponds directly to the non-modalization of the premise
other than one in which the middle term is distributed 5 ; when we update with
the special case, it becomes necessary, and thus the result corresponds to an LLL
syllogism which can, if required, be converted to a first figure one.
However, when we attempt to extend these semantics to the L-X-M fragment,
a number of problems emerge. First, we lose the close connection between the
modality of the special case and the validity of the syllogism. We cannot retain
the original definition of validity, since it makes valid a number of M -X syllogisms
that would not have been accepted by Aristotle 6 , for example MXM Barbara
and MXM Celarent. This follows because when we update with the special case
(the minor premise), MS  m,w  m for all w ∈ W ; then either the world which
made the major premise true is still in the model, in which case the conclusion
must also be true, or the conclusion is false in the updated model, but we have
then falsified the major premise. This will be the case for any syllogism where the
special case is non-modal; the update procedure will always promote an assertoric
premise to a necessary one. A similar problem occurs when the special case is
modal; since R is an equivalence relation, model reduction by a modal formula does
not change the model, and thus we can always create a counter-model where the
non-modalized form of the minor premise is true at a world other than the world
5 The rather convoluted description “premise other than one in which the middle term is distributed” is a
result of the fact that in Darapti, the middle term is distributed in both premises. Thus, either premise can
serve as the general rule to the other’s special case, which is reflected by the fact that XLL Darapti and
LXL Darapti are both valid, and this is the only mood where both the XLL and LXL versions are.
6 Aristotle doesn’t explicitly discuss syllogisms with pure possibility (as opposed to contingency) premises;
however, given his acceptance of proof by reductio ad absurdum, it is easy reconstruct which X-M syllogisms
would have to be valid given the validity of the L-X fragment.
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where the major premises is true, and false elsewhere. Then the minor premise is
possible, as required, but the conclusion is falsifiable.
The cause of both these problems is rooted in the same fact, namely, that our
semantics does not preserve the validity of modal reductio ad absurdum (contrapo-
sition) when at least one premise is possible, rather than assertoric or necessary.
While it may be possible to give a counterexample for every invalid syllogism in the
L-X fragment, there is no straightforward way of converting this into a counterex-
ample for the contraposed syllogism. The failure of contraposition in our semantics
stems from the fact that there is no correlation between the premise that is modal
and the premise that distributes the middle term in a syllogism and its contraposed
form. For example, in MXM Camestres, the major premise is modalized, and
the middle term is distributed in the minor; in its contraposition, XLL Ferison,
the minor premise is modalized and the middle term is distributed in the major.
On the other hand, in XMM Camestres, the minor is modalized and contains the
distributed middle, whereas in its contraposition, XLL Darii, the minor premise
remains modalized, but the middle term is distributed in the major premise. Thus,
contraposition breaks the close association between modality and distribution of
the middle that is seen in the L-X fragment of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. At this
point, we have not seen a way to generalize our definition of validity to validate
contraposition, so that we can extend our results to the L-X-M fragment.
8 Conclusion
We have provided a semantics which validates the axiomatization for the L-X frag-
ments of Aristotle’s modal syllogistics proposed in [7]. These semantics, which
crucially rely on a model update process, are much simpler than those found in pre-
vious literature, e.g., [3,4,6,15]. They take seriously Rescher’s proposal in [8] that
a modal syllogism should be interpreted as making a claim about a specific case of
a general scientific principle. This emphasis on the status of the special case, the
premise other than one where the middle term is distributed, gives rise to a type
of relative or conditional necessity, which is expressed in our system by the model
update process. This independent motivation for the use of the dynamic upgrade of
the premise which is special case means that our system is not ad hoc, but instead
has good philosophical grounding.
We have shown that a new definition of validity based on model update pro-
vides a sound semantics for the L-X fragment but we have also shown that it is
not straightforward to extend this definition to a larger fragment. We hope to
investigate such an extension in future work. Another question that we hope to
answer in future work involves relating the semantics we gave for the L-X frag-
ment to standard modern logical theories. Model updates such as the one that we
have proposed, where the truth of a formula at the evaluating world is required
before the update can proceed, correspond to truthful public announcements, à
la the Public Announcement fragment of epistemic logic [16]. Thus, one natural
open question is precisely what fragment of dynamic modal logic this fragment of
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